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Abstract
This article examines the central and unresolved question in the law of self-determination: who qualifies as a “people” entitled to exercise this right. While the right of peoples to self-determination is firmly established in international law, the absence of a clear and universally accepted definition of “peoples” has generated significant doctrinal uncertainty. This study analyzes the conceptual, legal, and jurisprudential approaches to defining “peoples,” drawing from international instruments, judicial decisions, and scholarly debates. It argues that the indeterminacy of the term is not accidental but reflects a deliberate flexibility within international law, allowing for political and contextual interpretation. The article concludes that the definition of “peoples” remains the core problem underlying disputes over self-determination and secession.
Keywords
Peoples; self-determination; identity; international law; secession; legal indeterminacy
1. Introduction
The right of peoples to self-determination is one of the most widely recognized principles in international law. Yet, its application depends on a prior and unresolved question: Who are the “peoples” entitled to exercise this right?
Unlike states, which possess clearly defined legal criteria for recognition, “peoples” remain conceptually ambiguous. International law affirms their rights but does not provide a precise definition of their identity.
This ambiguity is not merely theoretical. It has profound implications for:
- Claims to independence
- Territorial disputes
- The legitimacy of political communities
This article addresses a fundamental question: Can international law define “peoples” in a coherent and consistent manner, or is the concept inherently indeterminate?
2. Legal Recognition Without Definition
2.1 Codification of the Right
The right of self-determination is explicitly recognized in the Charter of the United Nations and in common Article 1 of both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
These instruments affirm that:
All peoples have the right of self-determination.
However, they do not define the term “peoples.”
2.2 The Absence of Definition
The absence of a legal definition stands in contrast to the precision found in other areas of international law, such as statehood.
This raises a critical issue:
👉 A right exists, but its subject remains undefined
This structural gap lies at the heart of the doctrine.
3. Conceptual Approaches to “Peoples”
3.1 Objective Criteria
One approach seeks to define “peoples” based on objective characteristics, including:
- Common ethnicity or origin
- Shared language
- Cultural or religious identity
- Historical continuity
- Territorial connection
These criteria attempt to provide measurable indicators of group identity.
3.2 Subjective Criteria
Another approach emphasizes subjective elements, such as:
- Collective self-identification
- Shared political will
- Consciousness of belonging
Under this view, a “people” exists when a group perceives itself as such.
3.3 Combined Approaches
Many scholars advocate a combination of objective and subjective factors. However, the relative weight of these factors remains contested, leading to inconsistent applications.
4. Jurisprudence and Judicial Reluctance
The International Court of Justice has repeatedly affirmed the importance of self-determination but has avoided providing a definitive definition of “peoples.”
In cases such as:
- Western Sahara (1975)
- East Timor (1995)
the Court recognized the right but did not clarify its subject.
This judicial reluctance reflects:
- The political sensitivity of the issue
- The difficulty of establishing universal criteria
5. Functional Interpretation
5.1 Context-Dependent Definition
In practice, international law tends to define “peoples” functionally, depending on context:
- In decolonization: populations of colonial territories
- In occupation: populations under foreign domination
- In minority contexts: potentially distinct groups within states
This flexible approach allows adaptation but reduces predictability.
5.2 The Role of Recognition
Recognition by the international community often plays a decisive role in determining whether a group is treated as a “people.”
This introduces a political dimension into what is ostensibly a legal question.
6. The Problem of Over-Inclusiveness and Fragmentation
6.1 Risk of Over-Inclusiveness
A broad definition of “peoples” could lead to:
- Proliferation of self-determination claims
- Fragmentation of existing states
- Instability in international relations
6.2 Risk of Under-Inclusiveness
Conversely, a narrow definition may:
- Exclude legitimate claims
- Perpetuate injustice
- Deny recognition to distinct communities
6.3 Balancing Concerns
International law attempts to balance these risks by maintaining conceptual ambiguity, allowing for case-by-case evaluation.
7. Indeterminacy as Structural Feature
7.1 Deliberate Ambiguity
The indeterminacy of “peoples” may be intentional. By avoiding rigid definitions, international law preserves flexibility and avoids creating rigid obligations.
7.2 Interaction with Territorial Integrity
The ambiguity of “peoples” serves to limit the expansion of self-determination in ways that could undermine territorial integrity.
This reinforces the structural tension identified in earlier articles.
7.3 Law and Politics
The determination of who qualifies as a “people” often involves political judgment. This reflects the broader interplay between law and power in international relations.
8. Critical Evaluation
8.1 Conceptual Weakness or Strategic Strength?
The absence of a clear definition can be seen as a weakness, undermining legal certainty. However, it may also be viewed as a strategic feature that allows international law to adapt to diverse situations.
8.2 Implications for Secession
Without a clear definition of “peoples,” claims to secession lack a stable legal foundation. This contributes to the exceptional nature of secession in international law.
8.3 Towards a Working Framework
Rather than seeking a rigid definition, it may be more practical to develop a working framework that considers:
- Identity
- Territory
- Political will
- Historical context
Such a framework could guide analysis without imposing strict boundaries.
9. Conclusion
The question of who qualifies as a “people” remains the core unresolved issue in the law of self-determination. Despite the widespread recognition of the right, its subject remains undefined, creating a fundamental gap in the legal framework.
This indeterminacy is not merely a technical problem but a structural feature of international law, reflecting the need to balance competing values of stability and legitimacy.
Understanding this ambiguity is essential for analyzing claims to self-determination and secession. It also provides the conceptual foundation for applying these principles to specific cases.